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We use a simple agent based model of value investors in financial markets to test three credit
regulation policies. The first is the unregulated case, which only imposes limits on maximum
leverage. The second is Basle II and the third is a hypothetical alternative in which banks
perfectly hedge all of their leverage-induced risk with options. When compared to the unregu-
lated case both Basle II and the perfect hedge policy reduce the risk of default when leverage is
low but increase it when leverage is high. This is because both regulation policies increase the
amount of synchronized buying and selling needed to achieve deleveraging, which can destabi-
lize the market. None of these policies are optimal for everyone: Risk neutral investors prefer
the unregulated case with low maximum leverage, banks prefer the perfect hedge policy, and
fund managers prefer the unregulated case with high maximum leverage. No one prefers Basle
II.
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21. Introduction
The recent crash in home and mortgage prices, and the ensuing global recession, has brought
forth numerous proposals for the regulation of leverage. The trouble is that many of these
proposals ignore the mechanism of the leverage cycle, and thus might unwittingly do more harm
than good.
Leverage is defined as the ratio of assets held to wealth. A homeowner who buys a house for
$100 by putting down $20 of cash and borrowing the rest is leveraged 5 to 1. One reason leverage
is important is that it measures how sensitive the investor is to a change in asset prices. In the
case of the homeowner, a $1 or 1% decline in the house price represents a 5% loss in his wealth,
since after he sells the house and repays the $80 loan he will only have $19 out of his original $20
of capital. Limiting leverage therefore seems to protect investors from themselves, by limiting
how much they can all lose from a 1% fall in asset prices. Basle II effectively puts leverage
limits on loans banks can give to investors, and furthermore it ties the leverage restriction to
the volatility of asset prices: if asset prices become more likely to change by 2% instead of 1%,
then Basle II curtails leverage even more. At first glance this seems like good common sense.
The leverage cycle, however, does not arise from a once and for all exogenous shock to asset
prices, whose damages to investors can be limited by curtailing leverage. On the contrary, the
leverage cycle is a process crucially depending on the heterogeneity of investors. Some investors
are more optimistic than others, or more willing to leverage and buy than others. When the
market is doing well these investors will do well and via their increased relative wealth and their
superior adventurousness, a relatively small group of them will come to hold a disproportionate
share of the assets. When the market is controlled by a smaller group of agents who are more
homogeneous than the market as a whole, their commonality of outlook will tend to reduce the
volatility of asset prices. But this will enable them, according to the Basle II rules, to leverage
more, which will give them a still more disproportionate share of the assets, and reduce volatility
still further. Despite the leverage restrictions intended from Basle II, the extremely low volatility
still gives room for very high leverage.
At this point some exogenous bad luck that directly reduces asset prices will have a dispro-
portionate effect on the wealth of the most adventurous buyers. Of course they will regard the
situation as an even greater buying opportunity, but in order to maintain even their prior lever-
age levels they will be forced to sell instead of buying. At this point volatility will rise and the
Basle II lending rules will force them to reduce leverage and sell more. The next class of buyers
will also not be able to buy much because their access to leverage will also suddenly be curtailed.
The assets will cascade down to a less and less willing group of buyers. In the end, the price of
the assets will fall not so much because of the exogenous shock, but because the marginal buyer
will be so different from what he had been before the shock. Thus we shall show that in some
conditions, Basle II not only would fail to stop the leverage build up, but it would make the
deleveraging crash much worse by curtailing all the willing buyers simultaneously. The policy
itself creates systemic risk.
We shall also see that another apparently sensible regulation can lead to disaster. Common
sense suggests it would be safer if the banks required funds to hedge their positions enough
to guarantee they can pay their debts before they could get loans. The trouble with this idea
is that when things are going well, the most adventurous leveragers will again grow, thereby
lowering volatility. This lower volatility will reduce their hedging costs, and enable them to
grow still faster and dominate the market, reducing volatility and hedging costs still more. Bad
luck will then disproportionately reduce the wealth of the most enthusiastic buyers. But more
importantly, it will increase volatility and thus hedging costs. This will force further selling by
the most enthusiastic buyers, and limit the buying power of the next classes of potential owners.
3In just the same way as Basle II, the effort to impose common sense regulation of leverage can
create bigger crashes.
In recent years a variety of studies including Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008), Geanakoplos
(2010), Adrian and Shin. (2008), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Thurner et al. (2012), and
Caccioli et al. (2012) have made it clear that deleveraging can cause systemic financial instabil-
ities leading to market failure, as originally discussed by Minsky (1992). The specific problem
is that regulatory action can cause synchronized selling, thereby amplifying or even creating
large downward price movements. In order to stabilize markets a variety of new regulatory mea-
sures have been proposed to suppress such behavior. But do these measures really address the
problem?
As pointed out in Thurner and Poledna (2013) systemic risk is not only related to network
properties but it is a multiplex network concept. By this we mean that systemic risk happens on
various layers of the financial system, which can all influence each other. The networks involved
include: borrowing and lending relationships (which can be further broken down into explicit
contractual obligations, i.e. counterparty exposures, and implicit relationships, such as roll-over
of overnight loans), insurance (derivative) contracts, collateral obligations, market impact of
overlapping asset portfolios and network of cross-holdings (holding of securities or stocks of
fellow banks). In this paper we focus on the systemic risk component of overlapping portfolios.
Our example here is simple, as there is only one risky asset. Contagion is transmitted between
agents when they buy or sell the asset, and as we will see, the use of leverage can lead to market
crises. A key point in this study is that crises emerge endogenously, under normal operation of
the model – there are long periods where the market is relatively quiet, but due to the build
up of leverage, the market becomes more sensitive to small fluctuations (which would at other
times have negligible effect).
Of particular interest here are leverage constraints, which are a significant part of financial
regulation. These constraints are implemented in numerous ways, most influential in the form
of capital adequacy rules in the Basle II framework and as margin requirements and debt lim-
its in the Regulations T, U, and X of the Federal Reserve System. Margin requirements were
established in the wake of the 1929 stock market crash with the belief that margin loans led to
risky investments resulting in losses for lenders (Fortune 2000). Fortune (2001) discusses the reg-
ulation, historical background, accounting mechanics and economic principles of margin lending
according to Regulations T, U, and X.
In comparison to straightforward leverage constraints, the Basle II capital adequacy rules
classify and weight assets of banks according to credit risk. Banks regulated under the Basle
II framework are required to hold capital equal to 8% of risk-weighted assets. A recent case
study of the Bank of Canada discusses unweighted leverage constraints as a supplement to
existing risk-weighted capital requirements (Bordeleau et al. 2009). The second of the Basle II
Accords (Basle II) capital adequacy regulations added a significant amount of complexity and
sophistication to the calculation of risk-weighted assets. In particular, banks are encouraged to
use internal models, such as value-at-risk (VaR), to determine the value of risk-weighted assets
according to internal estimations. In a nontechnical analyses of the Basle II rules, Balin (2008)
provides an easy accessible analysis of both the Basle I and Basle II framework.
Lo and Brennan (2012) provide an extensive overview of leverage constraints, pointing out
that regulatory constraints on leverage are generally fixed limits that do not vary over time
or with changing market conditions, and suggest that from a microprudential perspective fixed
leverage constraints result in large variations in the level of risk. Recent studies of central banks
also conclude that current regulatory leverage constraints are inadequate (Bhattacharya et al.
2011, Christensen et al. 2011). From a macroprudential perspective internal estimations of banks
appear to be cyclically biased in determining the value of risk-weighted assets, contributing
4to a procyclical increase in global leverage (Bordeleau et al. 2009). Keating et al. (2001) and
Dan´ıelsson (2002) have also argued that the Basle II regulations fail to consider the endogenous
component of risk, and that the internal models of banks can have destabilizing effects, inducing
crashes that would otherwise not occur.
Computational agent-based models have gained popularity in economic modeling over the last
decades and are able to reproduce some empirical features of financial markets that traditional
approaches cannot replicate(LeBaron 2008). An advantage of this approach is the ability to
implement institutional features accurately and to be able to simulate any model setup, without
the constraints of analytic tractability. An extensive review of financial multi-agent models can
be found in LeBaron (2006) and Hommes (2006). LeBaron (2006) has focused more on models
with many types of agents and Hommes (2006) concentrating more on models with a few types
of agents and the effects of heterogeneous strategies.
In this paper we use an agent-based financial market model introduced by Thurner et al.
(2012) to test the performance of several credit regulation policies. The model introduced by
Thurner et al. (2012) will be used as a baseline. In this work, the model is extended to allow
short selling and to incorporate different regulation policies. The use of this simulation model
allows us to explicitly implement and test any given regulatory policy. We test three different
cases: (1) An unregulated market, (2) the Basle II framework and (3) a hypothetical regulatory
policy in which banks completely hedge against possible losses from providing leverage (while
charging their clients the hedging costs). We find that when leverage is high both of the regulatory
schemes fail to guard against systemic financial instabilities, and in fact result in even higher
rates of default than no regulation at all. The reason for this is that both regulatory policies
compel investors to deleverage just when this is destabilizing, triggering failures when they would
otherwise not occur.
Agent-based models have often been criticized for making arbitrary assumptions, particularly
concerning agent decision making. We address this problem here by keeping the model simple
and making a minimum of behavioral assumptions. There are four types of investors:
(i) Fund managers are perfectly informed value investors that all see the same perfect val-
uation signal. They buy when the market is underpriced and sell when it is overpriced.
Fund managers are risk-neutral.
(ii) Noise traders are inattentive value investors. They buy or sell when the market is under
or over priced, but do so less efficiently than the fund managers. Noise traders are risk-
neutral.
(iii) Banks loan money to the fund managers to allow them to leverage. Banks are risk-averse,
though the extent to which this is true differs depending on the regulator scheme.
(iv) Fund investors place or withdraw money from the fund managers based on a historical
average of each fund’s performance.
The fund managers, which are the primary focus of this article, are heterogeneous agents, i.e.
there are multiple funds with different levels of aggression. In contrast, the other three types
are representative agents, i.e. there is a single noise trader, a single bank, and a single fund
investor. The primary function of the noise traders is to provide a background price series to
generate opportunities for the fund investor; the function of the fund investors is to guarantee
that the price dynamics can be run in a steady state without the fund managers becoming
infinitely wealthy. The bank is there to lend money to the funds, but it is a backdrop – the bank
is infinitely solvent. (It is nonetheless useful to examine welfare measures, such as the losses to
the bank, rate of default on loans, etc.)
The postulated behaviors of each type of agent are reasonably generic, and in some cases,
such as for the banks, we are merely codifying behaviors that are essentially mechanical and
5Figure 1. Schematic structure of the model: Fund managers buy a single risky asset when it is underpriced
and sell when it is overpriced. Noise traders also buy or sell when the market is under or over priced,
but do so less efficiently than the fund managers – the noise traders and fund managers have the same
notion of value. A representative bank loans money to the fund managers to allow them to leverage. In
the Basle II, and the perfect-hedge scheme fund managers pay fees for receiving loans, see Eqs. (20) and
(21). Investors place or withdraw money from the funds based on their historical performance. Funds are
heterogeneous based on the aggression of their investment strategy; more aggressive funds tend to use
more leverage. For fund manager profits see figure 8(c). In the model no actual fees are paid. The plot
corresponds to a hypothetical situation, which is certainly correct for small hedge funds.
legally mandated by the terms of contractual agreement or regulation. Most importantly, our
results are relatively insensitive to assumptions. The fact that this is a simulation model has
the important advantage of allowing us to quantitatively and explicitly evaluate any regulatory
scheme. This model is useful because it can incorporate more realism than a typical stylized
equilibrium model (Bouchaud 2008, Farmer and Foley 2009, Lux and Westerhoff 2009, Thurner
2011). This joins a growing class of agent-based models for testing economic policies that attempt
quantifiable, reproducible and falsifiable results, whose parameters are – at least in principle –
observable in reality. Recent studies that use agent-based models for testing economic policies
include Demary (2008), Haber (2008), Westerhoff (2008), Westerhoff and Franke (2012), Kerbl
(2010) and Hermsen (2010).
In Section 2, following Thurner et al. (2012) we present the model that serves as the baseline
for comparison of regulatory schemes. In Section 3 the modifications necessary to implement
the regulatory measures are explained. Section 4 presents simulation results comparing both the
Basle II-type regulation and the full perfect-hedge regulation schemes under various leverage
levels in the financial system. In Section 5 we conclude, discussing why Basle II-type systems –
even in their most ideal form – destabilize the market just when stability is most needed, i.e.
in times of high leverage levels in the system. At the heart of this problem are synchronization
effects of financial agents in time of stress.
2. The baseline model
The baseline model represents a market that is unregulated except for a maximum leverage
requirement. It is an agent-based model with four different types of agents as described in
Thurner et al. (2012). There is only a single asset, without dividends and consumption, and
investors are given a choice between holding the asset or holding cash. Prices are formed via
market clearing. In the subsequent paragraphs we give an overview of each type of agent, and
6then in the remainder of this section we describe their behavior in more detail.
In figure 1 we show a schematic structure of the model. The first type of agents are fund
managers, e.g. hedge funds or proprietary trading groups. They are value investors who ‘buy
low and sell high’. They use a strategy that translates a mispricing signal into taking a long
position (buying a positive quantity of the asset) when the asset price p(t) at time t is below a
perceived fundamental value V . We generalize the model of Thurner et al. by also allowing them
them to take a short position when the asset is over-priced, i.e. one for p(t) > V . The demand of
fund managers is denoted by Dh(t), where the subscript h refers to the fund manager. The fund
managers are heterogeneous agents who differ in the aggressiveness with which they respond to
buy and sell signals.
The second type of agent is a representative noise trader. This agent can be thought of as a
weakly informed value investor, who has only a vague concept of the fundamental price, and
thus buys and sells nearly at random, with just a small preference that makes the price weakly
mean-revert around V . The demand of noise traders at time t is Dn(t). The noise trader is
a representative agent, representing the pool of weakly-informed investors that cause prices to
revert toward value.
The third type of agent is a bank. Fund managers can increase the size of their long positions
by borrowing from the bank by using the asset as collateral. The bank limits lending so that
the value of the loan is always (substantially) less than the current price of the assets held as
collateral. This limit is called a minimum margin requirement. In case the asset value decreases
so much that the minimum margin requirement is no longer sustained, the bank issues a margin
call and the fund managers who are affected must sell assets to pay back their loans in order to
maintain minimum margin requirements. This happens within a single timestep in the model.
This kind of transaction is called margin trading and has the effect of amplifying any profit or
loss from trading. If large price jumps occur and fund managers cannot repay the loan even by
selling their complete portfolio, they default. In the baseline model, for simplicity interest rates
for loans are fixed to zero and the bank sets a fixed minimum margin requirement, denoted by
λmax.
The fourth type of agent is a representative fund investor who places or withdraws money
from a fund according to performance. This agent should be viewed as a representative agent
characterizing all investors, both private and institutional, who place money with funds that use
leverage. The amount invested or redeemed depends on recent historical performance of each
fund compared to a fixed benchmark return rb. Successful fund managers attract additional
capital, unsuccessful ones lose capital.
2.1. Price formation
At each timestep t asset prices p(t) are formed via market clearing by equating the sum over the
demand of the fund managers Dh(t) and the noise traders Dn(t) to the fixed total supply N of
the asset, which represents the number of issued shares. The market clearing condition is
Dn(t) +
∑
h
Dh(t) = N. (1)
At every timestep the fund managers must decide how much of their total wealth Wh(t) they
are going to invest. The wealth of a fund manager is the sum of her cash position Mh(t) and the
current (dollar) value of the asset Dh(t)p(t),
Wh(t) = Dh(t)p(t) +Mh(t). (2)
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Figure 2. Demand function Dh(t)p(t) of a fund manager as a function of the mispricing signal m(t) =
V − p(t). If the asset is underpriced the fund manager starts buying more and more assets as the price
decreases, until the maximum margin requirement (leverage limit) is hit at m = mcrit. Above this mis-
pricing the demand remains flat. If short selling is banned (dashed line) the fund manager holds no assets
if the asset is overpriced, whereas when short selling is allowed (solid line) the fund manager takes a
negative position on the asset when it is overpriced.
When a fund manager borrows cash for leveraging positions, the cash Mh(t) is negative, rep-
resenting the fact that she has spent all her money and is in debt to the bank. Leverage λh is
defined as the ratio between the fund manager’s portfolio value and her wealth,
λh(t) =
Dh(t)p(t)
Wh(t)
=
Dh(t)p(t)
Dh(t)p(t) +Mh(t)
. (3)
In case of short selling leverage is defined as the ratio of the asset side in the balance sheet and
the wealth,
λh(t) =
Wh(t)−Dh(t)p(t)
Wh(t)
=
Mh(t)
Dh(t)p(t) +Mh(t)
. (4)
The fund managers are value investors who base their demand Dh(t) on a mispricing signal,
m(t) = V − p(t). For simplicity the perceived fundamental value V is fixed at a constant value,
which is the same for all fund managers and noise traders. Figure 2 shows demand Dh(t) for a
fund manager h as a function of the perceived mispricing. As the mispricing increases, the fund
manager wants a linear increase of the value of the portfolio, Dh(t)p(t). However, this is bounded
when it reaches the maximum leverage level λmax, set by the bank. Fund managers differ in their
aggression parameter βh, which quantifies how strongly they respond to the mispricing signal
m(t). The fund manager’s demand function, Dh(t) = Dh(t, p(t)), can be written as
Dh(t) =


0 if m(t) < 0
λmaxWh(t)/p(t) if m(t) > mcrit
βhm(t)Wh(t)/p(t) otherwise,
(5)
8and when short selling is allowed1,
Dh(t) =


(1− λmax)Wh(t)/p(t) if m(t) ≤ mshortcrit
λmaxWh(t)/p(t) if m(t) > m
long
crit
βhm(t)Wh(t)/p(t) otherwise.
(6)
The parameter mcrit > 0 is the critical value of the mispricing signal above which the fund
manager is forced to flatten demand when short selling is not allowed, and similarly mshortcrit < 0
and mlongcrit > 0 are the corresponding parameters when short selling is allowed. Notice that
λmax > 1 is strictly required for short-selling.
To summarize, consider the case where short selling is allowed. When the asset is strongly
overpriced the value of the fund manager’s position is constant at the value Dh(t)p(t) = (1 −
λmax)Wh(t). Similarly when the asset is strongly underpriced the value is constant at λmaxWh(t).
Anywhere in between the value is βhm(t)Wh(t), i.e. it is proportional to the aggression parameter
βh, the mispricing m(t), the wealth Wh(t).
Every fund manager is required by the bank to maintain λh(t) ≤ λmax. If this condition would
be violated the fund manager must adjust her demand to buy or sell assets to ensure that such
a violation does not happen. This is known as meeting a margin call. The cause of a margin
call can be either because the price drops from p(t − 1) to p(t), causing Wh(t) to fall by a
larger percentage than the asset price (because of leverage), or because the wealth drops from
Wh(t−1) to Wh(t) due to withdrawals (redemptions) from investors, as will be discussed below.
Fund managers adjust their positions within each timestep to make sure that this condition is
never violated.
The noise trader demand is formulated in terms of the value ξn(t) = Dn(t)p(t), whose loga-
rithm follows an Ornstein–Uhlenbeck random process of the form
log ξn(t) = ρ log ξn(t− 1) + σnχ(t) + (1− ρ) log(V N), (7)
where χ is independent and normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation one, and
where 0 < ρ < 1. The Ornstein-Uhlenbeck process is a widely used approach to model currency
exchange rates, interest rates, and commodity prices stochastically. In the limit as ρ → 1, i.e.
without the mean reversion, the log-returns r(t) = log p(t + 1) − log p(t) of the asset price are
normally distributed. We choose a value of ρ close to one so that without fund managers the
price is weakly mean reverting around the fundamental value V and the log-returns are nearly
normally distributed.
2.2. Defaults
If the fund manager’s wealth ever becomes negative, i.e. if Wh(t) < 0, the fund manager defaults
and goes out of business. The fund manager must then sell all assets (Dh(t) = 0) and use the
revenue to pay off as much of the loan as possible. All remaining loss is born by the bank, causing
capital shortfall, which has to be provided by the government or a bailout fund. For simplicity
we assume banks always receive the necessary bailout funds and they continue to lend to other
fund managers as before. Tre−intro timesteps later the defaulting fund manager re-emerges as a
new fund manager, as described below.
1See Kerbl (2010): p. 6 for fund manager’s demand when short selling is allowed.
92.3. Wealth dynamics of the fund managers
Initially each fund manager has the same endowment, Wh(0) = W0. The wealth of the fund
manager then evolves according to
Wh(t) =Wh(t− 1) +Dh(t− 1)[p(t) − p(t− 1)] + Fh(t), (8)
where Dh(t−1)[p(t)−p(t−1)] reflects the profits and losses from trading of the fund manager’s
portfolio and Fh(t) quantifies the deposits or withdrawals of the fund investor.
The amount of cash a fund manager would have if selling all assets at the current price is
M˜h(t) = D(t− 1)p(t) +M(t− 1). (9)
The fund investor deposits or withdraws from each fund manager based on a moving average
of the recent performance which is measured by the rate of return. This prevents the wealth of
the fund managers from growing indefinitely, and makes possible well defined statistical averages
for properties such as returns and volatility. Let
rh(t) =
Dh(t− 1)[p(t) − p(t− 1)]
Wh(t− 1) , (10)
be the rate of return of fund manager h. The fund investors base their decisions on the recent
performance of fund h, measured as an exponential moving average of the rate of return
rperfh (t) = (1− a) rperfh (t− 1) + a rh(t). (11)
The flow of capital in or out of the fund manager is given by
Fh(t) = max
[
−1, b
(
rperfh (t)− rb
)]
max
[
0, M˜h(t)
]
, (12)
where b is a parameter controlling the fraction of capital withdrawn or invested, a is the mov-
ing average parameter, and rb is the benchmark return of the investors. This process is well
documented, see e.g. Busse (2001), Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Del Guercio and Tka (2002),
Remolona et al. (1997), Sirri and Tufano (1998). Fund investors cannot take out more cash than
the fund manager has.
In case a fund manager’s wealth falls below a critical threshold, Wcrit, the fund manager goes
out of business. This avoids the possibility of “zombie funds”, which persist for many timesteps
with nearly no wealth and no relevance for the market. After Tre−intro timesteps, funds that
default are replaced with a new fund with initial wealth W0 and the same aggression parameter
βh.
3. Implementation of regulatory measures
We now introduce two regulatory policies. The first is the regulatory measure to reduce credit risk
encouraged by the Basle II framework. The second regulation policy is an alternative proposal
in which all risk associated with leverage is required to be perfectly hedged by options.
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3.1. Basle II
The Basle II scheme that we employ here models the risk control policies used by banks regulated
under the Basle II framework. These banks use internal models to determine the value of their
risk-weighted assets. The banks are allowed discretion in their risk control as long as it is Basle
II compliant. We implement a Basel compliant model that is used in practice by banks.
3.1.1. Credit exposure
According to the Basle II capital adequacy rules banks have to allocate capital for their credit
exposure. The capital can be reduced through credit mitigation techniques, such as taking col-
lateral (e.g. securities or cash) from the counterparty on the loan. This reduces their net adjusted
exposure. However, to provide a safety margin haircuts are also applied to both the exposure
and the collateral. Haircuts are percentages that are either added or subtracted depending on
the context in order to provide a safety buffer. In the case of a collateralized loan, in the absence
of haircuts, the net exposure taking the risk mitigating effect of the collateral into account is
E∗ = E− k, where k is the value of the collateral. However, when haircuts are applied the value
of the raw exposure E is adjusted upward to E(1 + He), where He ≥ 0 is the haircut on the
exposure, and the value of the collateral k is adjusted downward to k(1−Hcol), where Hcol ≥ 0
is the haircut on the collateral. Thus the net exposure taking the risk mitigating effect of the
collateral into account is1
E∗ = max[0, E(1 +He)− k(1−Hcol)], (13)
The ‘max’ is present to make sure the exposure is never negative.
3.1.2. Haircuts
The basic idea is that undervaluing the asset creates a safety buffer which decreases the
likelihood that at some point in the future the value of the collateral will be insufficient to
cover possible losses. Increasing collateral has the dual effect of decreasing the chance that the
collateral might be insufficient to cover future losses, and of decreasing the size of loans when
collateral is in short supply. In general the size of the haircut, and hence the size of the exposure
and collateral, depends on volatility.
Haircuts can either be standard supervisory haircuts, issued by regulatory bodies2, or internal
estimates of banks. Permission to use internal estimates is conditional on meeting a set of
minimum standards3. Here we use a simple approach – used in practice by banks for their own
internal estimates satisfying the Basle II standards – and compute the haircuts Hcol using a
formula that sets a minimum floor on the haircut Hmin with an additional term that increases
with the historical volatility σ(t), measured in terms of standard deviation of log-returns over τ
time steps. We assume a loan of time duration T and a fixed cost c. The haircut is given by the
formula
Hcol(t) = min
[
max
(
Hmin,Φσ(t)
√
T + c
)
, 1
]
, (14)
where Φ is a confidence interval set by the bank in accordance with the regulatory body4.
1See Bank for International Settlements (2006): §147.
2See Bank for International Settlements (2006): §147 for recommendation on supervisory haircuts, e.g. haircut for equities
listed on a recognized exchange is 25%.
3See Bank for International Settlements (2006): §156-165 for qualitative and quantitative standards.
4
According to the Basel framework Φ must be chosen such that given a historical volatility σ(t) the haircut is sufficient in
99% of cases. See Bank for International Settlements (2006): §156.
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The use of the ‘min’ and ‘max’ guarantees that the haircut is always in the range Hmin ≤
Hcol ≤ 1.
The choice of a haircut implies a variable maximum leverage λadaptmax (t). Suppose a bank makes
a loan of size L to a fund that pledges the shares of the asset it buys as collateral. Then the raw
exposure is E = L and the value of the shares of the asset is k. By definition the leverage is
λadaptmax (t) =
k
k −E . (15)
Since the exposure is cash no haircut is required and He = 0, but the collateral is risky, so
Hcol > 0. If the net risk mitigated exposure E
∗ = 0, then combining Eqs. (13) and (15) implies
λadaptmax (t) =
1
Hcol(t)
. (16)
For short selling the fund borrows the asset (which is risky) and gives cash as collateral, so the
situation is reversed, and Hcol = 0 with He > 0. In this case He is set according to Eq. (14) with
He on the lefthand side instead of Hcol, and through similar logic
λadaptmax (t) =
1
He(t)
. (17)
This shows explicitly how the haircuts impose a limit on the maximum leverage. For example if
the haircut is 0.5 the maximum leverage is 2, whereas if the haircut is 0.1 the maximum leverage
is 10.
To make correspondence with the unregulated case we set Hmin =
1
λmax
and Φ = 1λmaxσb , where
σb is a benchmark volatility that serves as an exogenous parameter. Furthermore, for simplicity
we set transaction costs to zero, i.e. c = 0, and the holding duration of the collateral to one
timestep, T = 1. Then by combining Eqs. (14) and (16) we see that the adaptive maximum
leverage explicitly depends on volatility,
λadaptmax (t) = max
[
λmaxmin
(
1,
σb
σ(t)
)
, 1
]
. (18)
If the historical volatility σ(t) ≤ σb then full maximum leverage λmax can be used by the fund
managers. When the simulation is operating under the Basle II scheme the λmax in the fund
manager’s demand of equation (5) is replaced by λadaptmax (t) in equation (18).
3.1.3. Spreads
To determine interest rates on loans to fund managers, banks add a risk premium (spread)
S to a benchmark interest rate ib. Usually S is determined by rating a customer, but in many
cases such as margin trading a fixed risk premium is used for all customers of a given type. We
use a fixed spread S for all fund managers. The interest rate for the fund manager h is
ih = ib + S. (19)
To implement borrowing costs in the agent-based model we set the benchmark interest rate
ib = 0 and add a term accounting for the spread S to equation (8). Fund managers always pay
the borrowing costs for the previous timestep. In case the fund manager takes a leveraged long
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position (Mh is negative) her wealth is
Wh(t) =Wh(t− 1) +Dh(t− 1)[p(t) − p(t− 1)] + Fh(t) +Mh(t− 1)S, (20)
and in case of short selling, where the demand is negative,
Wh(t) =Wh(t− 1) +Dh(t− 1)[p(t)− p(t− 1)] + Fh(t) +Dh(t− 1)p(t− 1)S. (21)
The maximum amount the fund investor can redeem from the fund manager has to be adjusted
from equation (9) to
M˜h(t) = D(t− 1)p(t) +M(t− 1)[1 + S] [long]
M˜h(t) = D(t− 1)p(t) +M(t− 1) +Dh(t− 1)p(t− 1)S [short]. (22)
This guarantees that obligations to banks are satisfied before those of investors, as is the usual
practice.
3.2. The perfect-hedge scheme
The idea behind the perfect-hedge scheme is that, in addition to holding the shares of the asset
as collateral, banks require all loans to be hedged by options. Thus barring default of the issuer
of the option, the loan is completely secure.
3.2.1. Hedging
We first consider the case where the fund is long, in which case the bank requires it to buy a
put with strike price Kput. For simplicity we treat the loan as an overnight loan and thus the
put has a maturity of one day. To make sure that the loan can be repaid, the value of the asset
must equal the value of the loan. If the price of the asset when the loan is made is p(t), from
Eq. (15) the fraction by which it can drop in price before the value of the collateral is less than
that of the original loan is (k − E)/E = 1/λh(t). The strike price is thus
Kput(t) = p(t)
(
1− 1
λh(t)
)
, (23)
and via similar reasoning, in the case where the fund is short it buys a call option with strike
price
Kcall(t) = p(t)
(
1 +
1
λh(t)− 1
)
. (24)
Option prices are assumed to obey the Black-Scholes formula (Black and Scholes 1973). The
option price is calculated based the following parameters: The spot price of the underlying asset
is p(t), the risk-free interest rate r = 0, and the volatility σ = θσ(t), where σ(t) is the historical
volatility1. When the fund is long the strike price Ph of the put option is K = Kput and when
it is short the strike price Ch of the call option is Kcall. Note that the option prices depend on
1We use the historical volatility σ(t), defined as the standard deviation of the log-returns of the underlying asset over τ
timesteps. Volatility is multiplied by an arbitrary factor θ to gauge the length of one timestep. In the simulations we set
θ = 5
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the leverage through the strike prices; as the leverage increases the options get closer to be in
the money and so their price increases.
To implement the hedging costs in the model we add a term for the option costs to equation
(8). In case the fund manager holds a long position hedging cost is Ph(t)Dh(t−1) and the wealth
becomes
Wh(t) =Wh(t− 1) +Dh(t− 1)[p(t) − p(t− 1)] + Fh(t)−Dh(t− 1)Ph(t− 1), (25)
and similarly for short selling
Wh(t) =Wh(t− 1) +Dh(t− 1)[p(t)− p(t− 1)] + Fh(t) +Dh(t− 1)Ch(t− 1). (26)
The maximum redemption of fund investors is adjusted for long positions
M˜h(t) = D(t− 1)p(t) +M(t− 1))−Dh(t− 1)Ph(t− 1), (27)
and for short selling is
M˜h(t) = D(t− 1)p(t) +M(t− 1)) +Dh(t− 1)Ch(t− 1). (28)
Note that the only risk now for the bank is that in case the fund defaults, it will not be able to
pay for the hedging costs Ph(t− 1) at the previous timestep.
To make a correspondence to the spreads defined under the Basle II agreement, the effective
spreads are1
S
[long]
h (t) =
Ph(t)
p(t)
(
1− 1λh(t)
) and S[short]h (t) = Ch(t)p(t) . (30)
3.2.2. Limit on hedging costs and maximum leverage
Absent any other constraints, under the above scheme there is the possibility that the maxi-
mum leverage could become arbitrarily large, and consequently the hedging costs could become
very high. We prevent this by limiting leverage. To compute the limit on leverage needed to keep
the hedging cost below a given threshold, for long positions we impose a maximum hedging cost
Pmax. The corresponding dynamic maximum leverage λ
hedge
max (t) can then be found by solving
P (p(t), σ(t), λhedgemax (t)) = Pmax(t), (31)
for λhedgemax (t).
Similarly, just as in the Basle II scheme, there is the possibility that historical volatility (Eq.
(30)) could become arbitrarily low. To prevent this we solve the same equation assuming a fixed
1
To see this, note that Dh(t)Ph(t) and Dh(t)Ch(t) is the effective interest the funds have to pay for being long or short,
respectively. To calculate an interest rate we divide the interest by the loan size, i.e.
Dh(t)Ph(t)
Dh(t)p(t) −Wh(t)
=
Dh(t)Ph(t)
−Mh(t)
. (29)
Note that Mh(t) is negative because the fund owes cash to the bank. By using Wh(t) = Dh(t)p(t)/λh(t) in
Dh(t)Ph(t)/(Dh(t)p(t) − Wh(t)), we obtain Eq. (30). In case of short selling interest divided by the loan is
(Dh(t)Ch(t))/(Dh(t)p(t)) = Ch(t)/ph(t), as is Eq. (30).
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Figure 3. Maximum leverage function λadaptmax (t) for fund managers as a function of historical volatility
σ(t) for the two regulation schemes. The dashed red curve shows the Basle II scheme of equation (18),
the solid blue curve shows the perfect-hedge scheme of equation (33).
volatility floor σb, which gives the maximum leverage as the solution of
P (p(t), σb, λmax) = Pmax(t), (32)
for λmax.
Finally, the leverage maximum λadaptmax (t) is their minimum, i.e.
λadaptmax (t) = min
[
λmax, λ
hedge
max (t)
]
. (33)
The perfect-hedge version of the agent-based model is obtained by replacing the maximum
leverage of equation (6) by equation (33). Analogous equations hold for the short selling scenario.
See figure 3 for the dependence of λadaptmax (t) as a function of σ(t).
4. Results
4.1. Performance and efficiency indicators
As performance indicators we use return to fund investors, profits to the fund managers, and
probability of default. Since the fund investor actively invests and withdraws money from fund
managers and funds have to cover for expenses, i.e. interest payments, the rate of return rh(t)
does not properly capture the actual return to fund investors. To solve this accounting problem
we compute the adjusted rate of return radj to fund investors for any given period from t = 0 to
t = T . This is done by adjusting the wealth Wh(t) of fund managers by the net flow of capital
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and the expenses within a given period, according to
radjh (T ) =
W adjh (T )
Wh(0)
− 1 (34)
with
W adjh (T ) =Wh(T )−
T∑
i=0
Fh(i) + f(T ), (35)
where f is an adjustment for the expenses of the fund manager in a given period. In particular
we have for long position under the Basle II scheme
f(T ) =
T∑
i=0
Mh(i)S, (36)
and in the perfect hedge case
f(T ) =
T∑
i=0
Dh(i)Ph(i). (37)
Expenses of fund managers for short positions are calculated in a similar way as described in
section 3.1.3 and 3.2.2. If a fund manager is out of business at t = T , Wh(T ) is set to zero and
radjh (T ) will be close to −1, deviations coming from the net flow of capital and expenses of the
fund manager in the given period.
For management fees we use a hypothetical 2% fixed fee for assets under management and a
20% performance fee, paid by the fund investor to the fund managers. These fees are hypothetical
and are not used as actual transactions in the model. They are only to indicate the profitability
of fund managers under various conditions. If a fund manager goes out of business management
fees are not paid.
We also consider the average annualized cost of capital, which is the effective interest rate ih(t)
from equation (19) and (30). By annualized we mean that one simulation timestep represents five
trading days and one year has 250 trading days. As performance indicators we monitor the stan-
dard deviation of the log-returns r(t) for all timesteps from an entire simulation run as an asset
volatility ‘index’. Additionally we calculated the distortion as defined in Westerhoff and Franke
(2012), i.e. the average absolute distance between log price and log fundamental V . Note that in
our case the distortion is closely related to volatility. We explicitly checked that the distortion
closely follows the curves of figure 7(a). As a measure for trading volume we use the average
number of shares traded per timestep 1/HT
∑H
h=1
∑T
t=1 |Dh(t)−Dh(t− 1)|, with T denoting
the number of timesteps in a simulation run and the number of fund managers H = 10. Finally,
we measure the capital shortfall of banks by just keeping track of the amount of money they
lose when funds default.
4.2. Model Calibration: Choice of Parameters
For all simulations we used 10 fund managers with βh = 5, 10, . . . , 50, and simulation parameters
ρ = 0.99, σn = 0.035, V = 1, N = 1 × 109, rb = 0.003, a = 0.1, b = 0.15, W0 = 2 × 106,
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Wcrit = 2× 105, Tre−intro = 100, τ = 10, θ = 5, σb = 0.01175 and S = 0.00015. For most runs we
used a range of λmax ∈ [1, ..., 20].
To test the robustness of the model we tested several different parameter sets, varied key
parameters and motivated parameter choices in their economic context. A complete analysis
of the robustness of the model is not feasible because of the large number of parameters, and
because several parameters cannot be set independently.
Reducing or increasing the number of fund managers H affects the wealth Wh(t) of individual
fund managers. With more fund managers individual banks accumulate less wealth. Therefore
individual bankruptcies of fund managers become less severe resulting in lower capital shortfall
for banks. Increasing the aggressiveness of fund managers βh causes them to react more to
mispricing, resulting in more margin calls and subsequent defaults.
The parameters ρ, σn, V , N determine the demand of noise traders. σn is set to reflect typical
stock price fluctuations. N , V and W0 are chosen to guarantee that fund managers have a low
market share when they are introduced in market. We choose to arbitrarily set V = 1 and
choose N and W0 accordingly. The setting of ρ ∼ 1 ensures that the deviation from the normal
distribution is minimal. With ρ = 0.99 the typical fluctuation in volatility is about 1%, which is
a reasonable volume given real stock values.
The benchmark return rb plays the important role of determining the relative size of hedge
funds vs. noise traders. If the benchmark return is set very low then funds will become very
wealthy and will buy a large quantity of the asset under even small mispricings, preventing the
mispricing from ever growing large. This effectively induces a hard floor on prices. If the bench-
mark return is set very high, funds accumulate little wealth and play a negligible role in price
formation. The interesting behavior is observed at intermediate values of rb where the funds’
demand is comparable to that of the noise traders. The parameter ”a ” governs the exponen-
tial moving average of the performance of fund managers and the parameter ”b” controls the
sensitivity of withdrawals or contributions of fund investors. Both parameters a and b are set em-
pirically, following work from Busse (2001),Chevalier and Ellison (1997), Del Guercio and Tka
(2002), Remolona et al. (1997) and Sirri and Tufano (1998).
Using a positive survival threshold for removing funds Wcrit avoids the creation of zombie
funds that persist for long periods of time with almost no wealth. Setting Tre−intro = 100,
which controls the reintroduction of funds after bankruptcies, corresponds to 2 years under the
calibration that one timestep is five days, which we think is a reasonable value. Higher settings
for Tre−intro result in simulations with few fund managers present at turbulent times.
The parameter τ is chosen to measure historical volatility over a short window. Choosing
different windows τ 5 < τ < 20 does not substantially influence the simulations.
The parameter θ is an arbitrary factor that sets the length of one timestep. We choose to use
a calibration in which one timestep is five days and a year has 250 trading days. This calibration
seems reasonable considering several factors such as the average rate of return to fund investors,
which would be ∼ 8% (for high leverage scenarios, not considering defaults) or the benchmark
rate of return, which would be 15%.
The benchmark volatility σb is set empirically to a very low volatility that is only reached in
tranquil times. Alternatively it would be possible to refrain from using σb and set Hmin and Φ
or Pmax directly.
The parameter S is a risk premium (spread) to a benchmark interest rate ib, see above. We
use a fixed spread S for all fund managers of 0.75%. This low risk premium of approximately
1% reflects the fact that loans are fully collateralized in the model.
17
−0.4 −0.2 0 0.2 0.410
−8
10−6
10−4
10−2
100
r
fre
qu
en
cy
 
 
noise traders
λ
max
 = 1
λ
max
 = 15
λ
max
 = 15 (s.s.)
−0.4 −0.2 0 0.2 0.410
−8
10−6
10−4
10−2
100
r
fre
qu
en
cy
 
 
λ
max
 = 15 (unreg.)
λ
max
 = 15 (basel)
λ
max
 = 15 (perfect. h.)
Figure 4. The distribution of log-returns r. (a) Return distributions of the baseline model (with pa-
rameters from subsection 4.2) in semi-log scale. The un-leveraged case (blue circles) practically matches
the case with only noise traders (blue curve). When the maximum leverage is raised to λmax = 15 (red
squares) the distribution becomes more leptokurtic, and negative returns develop a fat tail. With short
selling (demand equation (6)) the distribution becomes even thinner and tails turn fat on both sides. (b)
Return distributions for the three regulation schemes at λmax = 15.
4.3. Returns and correlations
The statistical properties of asset price returns change considerably with increasing leverage.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of log-returns r(t) for four cases: (i) For the case of noise traders
only, log-returns are almost normally distributed. (ii) With un-leveraged fund managers, volatil-
ity is slightly reduced but log-returns remain nearly normally distributed. (iii) When leverage
is increased to λmax = 15 and no short selling is allowed, the distribution becomes thinner for
small r(t) but the negative returns develop fat tails. The asymmetry arises because with a short
selling ban in place fund managers are only active when the asset is underpriced, i.e. when the
mispricing m(t) > 0. Finally, when short selling is allowed (iv), the distribution becomes yet
more concentrated in the center and fat tails develop on both sides. Due to higher risk involving
short selling, the distribution becomes slightly asymmetric. This higher short selling risk arises
because of the different risk profile of long and short positions. The potential losses from long
positions are limited, since the price cannot go below zero. This is not the case for short posi-
tions, where the loss potential has no limit. Note that in all cases the autocorrelation of signed
returns is very small, whereas the autocorrelation of absolute returns is strongly positive and
decays slowly.
4.4. Timeseries
The timeseries shown in figure 5 are computed for the perfect-hedge scheme when short selling
is allowed at λmax = 15. Figure 5(a) shows the wealth Wh(t) for all 10 fund managers over time,
figure 5(b) shows the historical asset volatility and figure 5(c) shows the timeseries of the asset
price p(t). The leverage cycle can be observed in this figure. Initially, all fund managers start
with Wh(0) = 2 and have a marginal influence on the market. As they gain more wealth their
market impact increases, mispricings are damped and the asset volatility decreases. The decrease
in volatility results in lower borrowing cost for the fund managers. Lower borrowing cost allows
them to use a higher leverage, which further lowers volatility, resulting in even lower borrowing
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Figure 5. Timeseries for perfect-hedge scheme for 10 fund managers with βh = 5, 10, . . . , 50, for λmax =
15. The simulation was done for the perfect-hedge scheme with maximum leverage equation (33) and
wealth equations (25) and (26). Simulation parameters are listed in subsection 4.2. (a) Wealth timeseries
Wh(t) of the fund managers. (b) Historical volatilities over a τ = 10 timestep window. For reference, in
a market with noise traders only, the volatility is about σ(t) ≈ 17.5 percent. For comparison the inset
shows the VIX (Chicago Board Options Exchange Market Volatility Index), a measure of the implied
volatility of S&P 500 index options from 2004 to 2012. Our model reproduces the asymmetric profile in
which volatility bursts are initiated by a rapid rise followed by a gradual fall. (c) Timeseries of the asset
price p(t).
costs etc.. This leads to seemingly stable market conditions with low volatility and low borrowing
costs for fund managers; such stable periods can persist for a long time. Occasionally the stable
periods are interrupted by crashes. These are triggered by small fluctuations of the noise trader
demand. As shown in Thurner et al. (2012), if one or more of the funds is at its leverage limit,
a downward fluctuation in price causes the leverage to rise. This triggers a margin call, which
forces the fund to sell into a falling market, amplifying the downward fluctuation. This may cause
other funds to sell, driving prices even further down, to cause a crash. Such crashes can trigger
price drops as large as 50%, which cause the more highly leveraged fund managers to default.
After a crash noise traders dominate and volatility is high. Fund managers are reintroduced; as
their wealth grows volatility drops, and the leverage cycle starts again. In situations where a
crash wipes out all but the least aggressive fund managers, as happens around t = 29, 000 and
at about t = 47, 000, the surviving less aggressive fund managers become dominant for extended
periods of time.
4.5. Volatility profile
One of the interesting aspects of our model is that it reproduces the asymmetric profile of
volatility bursts. The inset of figure 5(b) shows the VIX (Chicago Board Options Exchange
Market Volatility Index), which is a measure of the implied volatility of S&P 500 index options,
from 2004 to 2012. As can seen by eye in this figure, in our model, as in the real data, volatility
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Figure 6. Peak behavior of the VIX (a), our model (b) and a GARCH(1,1) model (c). We find that the
rise and fall of volatility during a peak follows roughly a power law of the form σ(t) ∝∼ tk. The fitted
values for the rise of the VIX are k1 ∼ 16.39 and for our model k1 ∼ 9.19. The VIX gradually falls with
k2 ∼ −2.34 and for our model with k2 ∼ −1.18. GARCH models do not exhibit power-law behavior, and
k1 and k2 can not be fitted. In each case we show two characteristic time series in blue (solid line) and
red (dashed line), normalized to have the same peak height. The time axis is shifted so that peaks occur
at t = 500. Otherwise, the time axis is not normalized or gauged to real time.
bursts rise rapidly and damp out gradually, forming a very characteristic asymmetric peak.
To see this more quantitatively in Figure 6 we compare the peak behaviors of the VIX, our
model and a GARCH(1,1) model. Two example time series around a peak are shown for each.
The data is normalized so that the peaks are all of the same height. The time axis is shifted so
that peaks occur at t = 500. Otherwise, the time axis is not normalized or gauged to real time.
We fit the rise and decay around the peaks as a power law of the form σ(t) ∝∼ tk, characterizing
the rise by k = k1 and the decay by k = k2, and take the average for the largest peaks in the
time series, both from the VIX and from our model. To determine which peaks to fit, we selected
local maxima that are at least (max(VIX)−min(VIX))/4) or (max(σ(t))−min(σ(t)))/4) above
the surrounding data. The fitted values for the rise of the VIX are k1 ∼ 16.39 and for our model
k1 ∼ 9.19. The VIX gradually falls with k2 ∼ −2.34 and for our model with k2 ∼ −1.18. GARCH
models do not exhibit power-law behavior and k1 and k2 cannot be fitted. Note that while the
form of the peaks is the same for the VIX and our model, the magnitude is not; also the VIX
follows the profile with less noise than our model does. A possible reason for this is that the VIX
shows the implied volatility of S&P 500 index, while our model shows the volatility of a single
asset.
As a further statistical comparison we calculated the standardized moments skewness and
kurtosis. The skewness of the VIX (∼ 2.02) is virtually identical to our model (∼ 2.01), however
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Figure 7. Impacts of regulatory measures on market indicators as λmax varies. (a) Volatility of the
underlying asset. (b) Market volume of the underlying asset, measured by the average amount of shares
traded by a fund manager per timestep. (c) Average effective leverage of fund managers (d) Average
annualized effective interest rate. For all simulations we used 10 fund managers with βh = 5, 10, . . . , 50
over 5 × 104 timesteps. Simulation parameters listed in subsection 4.2, short selling was allowed. For all
indicators it is assumed that one timestep takes five days and a year has 250 trading days. Blue, green, and
red curves indicate the unregulated, the Basle II, and the perfect-hedge scheme, respectively. Standard
deviations computed over 100 independent runs are below symbol size.
the kurtosis of the VIX (∼ 8.13) is lower compared to our model (∼ 14.59). Note that the
VIX shows even in tranquil times quite substantial volatility in comparison to our model, where
extended periods with almost no volatility can be observed. The reason for this is that in times
of high market share of the fund managers, the effect on the asset price of the noise traders is
negligible. All fund managers have the same perceived fundamental value V and thus stabilize the
asset price to a point where almost no volatility can be observed. With a different fundamental
value Vh for every fund manager the behavior would become less synchronized and therefore,
even in tranquil times, volatility would remain at a substantial level. We have explicitly checked
this in a series of experiments.
4.6. Comparison of regulatory schemes
In the following we illustrate the impacts of the three regulatory schemes:
(i) The unregulated baseline scheme from section 2 with fixed maximum leverage λmax,
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Figure 8. Impacts of regulatory measures on performance indicators for the most aggressive fund manager
with βh = 50 as λmax varies. (a) Average annual probability of fund failure. (b) Average annual adjusted
rate of return radj to fund investors. (c) Average annual profits to the fund managers. (d) Annual capital
shortfall of banks. For all simulations we used the same setup as in the previous figure. Standard deviations
computed over 100 independent runs are about 0.01, 0.01, 2.7 × 105 and 5.4 × 105 for (a), (b), (c) and
(d), respectively.
corresponding to demand equation (6).
(ii) The Basle II scheme, which has the same demand equation but with λmax replaced by
λadaptmax (t) of (18) and the wealth update given by (20) and (21).
(iii) The perfect-hedge scheme, where λadaptmax (t) is given by (33) and the wealth update is (25)
and (26).
For all simulations we used the parameters listed in subsection 4.2 and enabled short selling.
λmax was varied from 1 to 20. For each parameter set we compute 5×104 timesteps and average
over 100 independent runs. The following indicators are annualized using a calibration in which
one timestep is five days and a year has 250 trading days. This calibration seems reasonable
considering several factors such as the average rate of return to fund investors, which would be
∼ 8% (for high leverage scenarios, not considering defaults) or the benchmark rate of return,
which would be 15%.
Figure 7 provides a panel of results that show how market characteristics such as (a) price
volatility, (b) trading volume, (c) average leverage and (d) the effective interest rate are affected
by the varying the maximum leverage parameter λmax under each of the three regulatory schemes.
For the unregulated case the volatility drops monotonically as λmax increases, dropping by almost
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a factor of two for 1 < λmax < 10 and then reaching a plateau. The reason the volatility drops is
that the presence of value investors ordinarily damps volatility, since they buy when prices fall
and sell when prices rise. Larger leverage means more trading and it also means higher profits
for a given level of trading, which means investors place more money in the funds and they
have more market power. The resulting increase in trading is evident in Figure 7 (b): Between
λmax = 1 and λmax = 3 the trading volume increases by more than a factor of three, and then
more or less levels off.
Volatility is not significantly influenced by failures of fund managers. Bankruptcies of the
most aggressive fund manager occur on average every 800 time steps for λmax > 7. Therefore
the subsequent price drops or jumps do not occur frequently enough to substantially influence
volatility.
The behavior of the volatility under the Basle II scheme is more complicated, as is evident
in Figure 7 (a). The volatility initially rises, reaching a maximum at λmax ≈ 2 and then falls,
although never to the low level of the unregulated case.
The explanation for the initial rise in volatility comes from the fact that for λmax = 1 there is
no short selling possible, see Eq. (6). In this case there are long-only funds only. As λmax = 2,
funds now also engage in short selling and we experience an effective regime-shift from a long-
only to a long-and-short model. Note that the average leverage for the Basle II regime (Fig. 7
(c)) is below 1, meaning that there are often cases where there is no leverage. In those situations
where a leverage reduction from λ > 1 to λ = 1, fund managers are forced out of short positions
leading to do extra trading activity (that does not exist for the λmax = 1 case) that slightly
raises the volatility.
The behavior of the perfect hedge scheme is also more complicated; it initially falls until
λmax ∼ 10, but then rises again.
The reason for the increase in volatility for large λmax under the perfect hedge scheme is
that for high maximum leverage the effective borrowing costs are large, as illustrated in Figure
7 (d). This is also the reason why in this scheme the trading volume drops for λmax > 10.
(See equations (19) and (30)). For the unregulated case the borrowing costs are zero (since for
convenience we set the base interest rate to zero), whereas under the Basle II scheme they are
fixed. In the perfect hedge scheme the costs are near zero for small leverage and then grow sharply
starting at about λmax ≈ 5, and exceed the costs for the Basle II scheme at about λmax ≈ 12.
Thus the perfect hedging scheme is cheaper than the Basle II scheme for low leverage and more
costly for high leverage.
Figure 7 (c) shows the average effective leverage of fund managers, defined as
〈λh(t)〉 = 1
HT
H∑
h=1
T∑
t=1
λh(t).
For the unregulated case, as expected, the average leverage initially increases as λmax increases.
It rises from 〈λh(t)〉 ≈ 0.4 when λmax = 1 to a little less than two when λmax ≈ 5. Surprisingly,
however, it then decreases until about λmax ≈ 10, settling into a plateau for λmax > 10 with
〈λh(t)〉 ≈ 1.5. The reason for the decrease is the drop in volatility, which means that there are
fewer mis-pricings and less opportunities to use leverage. The Basle II and perfect hedge schemes
behave similarly, except that they drop very little after their peaks, which are reached at larger
λmax, and their plateau leverage is higher, with 〈λh(t)〉 ≈ 2.
Figure 8 shows a variety of diagnostics about market performance, including (a) the probability
of fund default, (b) return to investors, (c) profits for fund managers and (d) capital shortfall of
banks.
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Figure 8 (a) shows the average annual probability of default for the most aggressive fund
manager. In the unregulated scheme the annual probability of default initially grows rapidly, but
then reaches a plateau at λmax ≈ 8. The reason for this is that under the unregulated scheme
the use of leverage is automatically self-limiting due to dropping volatility, as demonstrated in
Figure 7(c). For the Basle II and perfect hedge schemes the initial rise in defaults is slower, but
unlike the unregulated case the default rate never plateaus, and default exceeds the unregulated
scheme for roughly λmax > 11. The reason that there are more defaults in both regulated
schemes is that the maximum leverage is adjusted dynamically. If the maximum leverage is
suddenly decreased when funds are at their maximum leverage, they are forced to sell en masse,
and the resulting market impact can trigger a crash1.
In figure 8(b) we show the average adjusted rate of return radj to fund investors for the most
aggressive fund manager. The return to fund investors is influenced mainly by three factors:
effective leverage, mis-pricing opportunities and probability of fund default. In each of the three
regulatory schemes the investor returns behave similarly, initially increasing with λmax, reaching
a peak, and then decreasing. Under the Basle II and perfect hedge schemes the peaks come
later: For the unregulated scheme the peak is at λmax ≈ 4, for the perfect hedge scheme it is at
λmax ≈ 6, and for Basle II it is at roughly λmax ≈ 8. The primary reason there is a peak is the
rising default rate1.
Another important factor is decreased volatility, and hence fewer mispricings and lower ef-
fective leverage. For large λmax the perfect hedge case behaves increasingly poorly due to sky-
rocketing borrowing costs (see Figure 7(d)).
Figure 8(c) shows the fund managers’ profits. We assume a hypothetical 2% fixed fee for the
assets under management and a 20% performance fee. Profits to funds are consistently higher
in the unregulated scheme than in either of the alternatives. The discrepancy is exaggerated
relative to investors’ profits due to the fact that under the unregulated scheme the assets under
management by the funds are much larger. It is perhaps not surprising that fund managers
clearly prefer less regulation. Surprisingly, as λmax increases from one to two, fund managers’
profits initially drop; for the unregulated case it reaches a minimum about 30% less than the
unleveraged case, which for the regulated schemes is almost 75%. The origin of this problem is
the same as mentioned above, that for λmax = 1 it is not possible to short sell, see Eq. (6). In
this case we have long-only funds. As soon as we bring leverage to λmax = 2, funds engage in
short selling and we have a shift from a long-only to a long-and-short model. We have explicitly
checked this issue by tests, where we make the demand function for short selling Eq. (6) fully
symmetric to the long-part Eq. (5), by removing the 1 in Eq. (6). In this case no more drop in the
managers’ profits from λmax = 1 to λmax = 2 occurs. Note that this symmetric implementation
is of course not the correct one. Profits are consistently higher for the perfect hedge scheme than
they are in the Basle II scheme.
Finally, in Figure 8(d) we show the capital shortfall of banks. As expected the shortfall is the
largest for the unregulated case, and for the perfect hedge case it is zero by definition.
1
For λmax < 10 the perfect-hedge scheme performs a bit better than the Basle II scheme because of the stronger limit to
lending based on historical volatility illustrated in figure 3.
1
If funds that have gone bankrupt are excluded the performance reaches a maximum at λmax ∼ 7.
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5. Discussion
We studied an agent based model of a financial market where investors have different degrees
of information about the fundamental value of financial assets. Fund managers leverage their
investments by borrowing from banks. These speculative investments based on credit introduce
a systemic risk component to the system. When the collateral backing the involved loans are
composed of the same financial assets themselves, the model reproduces the various stages of the
leverage cycle, Geanakoplos (1997, 2003), Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008), Geanakoplos (2010),
and the systemic prerequisites leading up to crashes can be studied in detail, Thurner et al.
(2012). In this work we have studied the role of Basle II-type regulations, which define the
conditions under which banks can provide leverage. These regulations basically require Banks to
apply haircuts to the collateral accepted, and to take spreads. This raises the capital costs for
the leverage takers, so that they take less effective leverage than they would in the unregulated
case. We find that this is indeed the case for situations of low leverage in the system; regulation
makes the system more secure. On the other hand regulation reduces the market share of fund
managers in general, with the consequence that they take less volatility from the markets than
they would in the unregulated case. In this sense there is no optimal level of leverage or optimal
level of regulation. Regulation makes the markets more secure in the sense that it reduces the
frequency of large price jumps, but renders markets more volatile in general.
The situation changes drastically when the general level of leverage is high in the system, which
is the case for phases of low-volatility. When the leverage is greater than about 10, investors
in the regulated schemes take more effective leverage than they would in an unregulated world.
This is easy to understand: in the unregulated situation the fund managers become bigger (in the
model up to twice as big in terms of assets under management) and hence reduce volatility more
effectively. In this scenario the regulated system becomes less stable than the unregulated one,
which is for example reflected in a higher default rate of regulated investors than unregulated
ones. Also the regulated system does not manage to reduce the frequency of crashes. In terms of
capital shortfall of banks, the regulated system is superior to the unregulated one for all leverage
levels in the system.
We next designed a hypothetical regulation system, where banks require their investors to
hedge against the risk of loss of collateral value. Under the assumption that the writers of
options never default, by construction the capital shortfall of banks is zero. This regulation
scheme tests the effect of making the capital costs (effective interest rate) for the fund managers
dependent on the actual leverage taken; capital for higher leverage (and thus more systemic risk)
is more expensive. This is not the case for Basle II-type regulation, where the interest rate is
independent of leverage.
Even under the perfect hedging scheme the system does not get much safer on a systemic level.
The effects are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the Basle II-type scenario. However,
in terms of volatility reduction the perfect-hedge scheme is shown to be superior to the Basle II
scheme.
We have thus demonstrated that even under the assumption of a perfect-hedge scheme, sys-
temic risk originates from a source that is not addressed by present regulation mechanisms.
Systemic risk arises due to a synchronization of the agents’ behavior in times of high leverage.
Such synchronized behavior can become worse under regulation. This is because a lowering of
the maximum leverage at a point where some of the funds are fully leveraged can cause a wave
of selling, driving prices down and triggering even more selling, and in some cases leading to a
crash.
In this paper we do not propose a solution to the problem of credit regulation. However, our
belief is that a key element of any such regulation should be greater transparency. As argued in
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Thurner (2011), one can imagine a system where every credit provider has to disclose the amount
of its loans and the identity of the borrower on their homepage, and borrowers would have to
disclose their leverage. In this way there would develop a transparent credit market with emerging
lending rates, depending on the riskiness of the creditor and the borrower. Consequences of such
schemes are presently under investigation.
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